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The Balkans are undoubtedly one of Europe’s most tumultuous regions. Partly due to centuries of friction between great empires, and partly because of the unusual heterogeneity of its ethic composition, it is often compared to a “powder keg” for good reason. The coming months will witness a time of even greater than usual tension in this region, as Kosovo moves towards independence, and Bosnia-Herzegovina grapples with its unworkable political structure. Some commentators go as far as foreshadowing renewed conflicts. The growing antagonism between Russia and the West, played out through their proxies in Belgrade and Pristina, rekindles memories of another major conflict sparked in this very neighbourhood, almost 100 years ago. Much of the tension today however, is a result of the international community’s inadequate (and often misguided) response to the collapse of the former Yugoslavia in 1991. Part one of this two part series will look at the state of the Balkans today from the viewpoint of the major ethnic players in the region.

What Are The Problems

Yugoslavia did not disintegrate overnight. Analysts had foreshadowed it for decades, but most in the West paid little attention. At the beginning of the 1990s, Europe and the United States were intoxicated with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the fall of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the reunification of Germany. Far insufficient interest was given to the brewing catastrophe in the Balkans. When Yugoslavia did break apart, inconsistencies in the international response added fuel to the fire. The principles of inviolability of borders set out in the Helsinki Final Act were applied on an ad-hoc basis, with internal borders often taking precedence over internationally recognised ones. This resulted in the internationally-recognised Yugoslavia disintegrating along its republican boundaries, which did not adequately reflect its ethic distribution. The borders were drawn up in 1974 as part of constitutional reforms designed to appease Croatian secessionists while limiting Serbian domination. They were drawn some 60 years after Serbs, Croats and Slovenes first entered into a joint state. The incongruity between republic borders and ethnic distribution, along with the international community’s insistence on using the Helsinki Final Act to enforce the former, was a major contributor to the conflicts that ensued.

Ethnic distribution of former Yugoslavia

Viewpoints

Slovenes. The secession of the Republic of Slovenia caused little heartache to anyone. Slovenia’s population was over 80 per cent Slovene. Having become Yugoslavia’s most prosperous region after World War II, the newly independent country rapidly shed its socialist past and joined the European Union. For the most part, Slovenes are content with the outcome of the last two decades of their development.

Croats. The second-most developed region of Yugoslavia, Croatia suffered in its immediate post-independence years because of prolonged conflict with its ethnic Serb population. Serbs in Croatia refused to recognise the new state and declared their own Republic of Srpska Krajina, with the intention of reuniting with Serbia. In response to alleged ethnic cleansing of non-Serbs within the RSK, the Croatian Army launched Operation Storm in 1995 to return the region to Croatian control. With a large proportion of the Serb population expelled during the fall of the RSK, Croatia is now a predominantly mono-ethnic country (90 per cent Croat). Approximately 200,000 Croats live within Bosnia-Herzegovina, and attempts to unite this population with Croatia were made during the multilateral conflict in that country. Croats in Croatia are satisfied with the result of their War of Independence, and see their new nation as well-earned. Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina are somewhat less satisfied. The Dayton Agreement which ended the war in Bosnia in 1995, gave the Croats autonomy within their regional cantons, within the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (“Muslim-Croat Federation”). Croats in Bosnia still feel that Bosnian Muslims dominate the Federation, and ambitions for secession are not far below the surface. These ambitions are made difficult to realise because the Croatian regions of the Federation are not contiguous with each other, and in some cases the Republic of Croatia.

Yugoslav Macedonians. Most Macedonians lived within the borders of the Republic of Macedonia, and as such, their declaration of independence left them unified. Tensions in the independent Macedonia are between ethnic Albanians, who account for 25 per cent of the population, and Yugoslav Macedonians. This led to armed conflict in 2001. Various Albanian guerrilla groups are advocating partition and federalisation of Macedonia along ethnic lines, or even all out independence for the Albanian-held territories. Some desire unification with Kosovo or Albania, or both. Peace in Macedonia is largely dependent on the outcome of the Kosovo status negotiations, and a regional conflict could very easily spill over into this country.

Montenegrins. Montenegro has historically always been a proud and independent kingdom, until its voluntary union with Serbia in 1918. This persisted until 2006, with its declaration of independence dissolving the State Union of Serbia-Montenegro. Close to half of the Slav population of Montenegro considers themselves Serbs, and as such would have favoured continued union with Serbia. There are no significant separatist tendencies in this group however, and relations between the independent states of Serbia and Montenegro are amicable. Regions of Montenegro bordering Kosovo have a predominantly Albanian population, and some extremist groups desire unification with Kosovo. As in the case of Macedonia, a regional conflict sparked in Kosovo could spill over into Montenegro.

Bosnian Muslims. The Bosniaks, as they are often called, are unhappy with the outcome of their country’s independence. Based on historical links to pre-Slav pagan tribes of the region, the Bosniaks see themselves as the rightful heirs to all of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This history is disputed by Serbian and Croatian scholars, who claim that the Bosniaks are in fact Serbs and Croats who converted to Islam during the Ottoman occupation. The Bosniaks’ dissatisfaction stems from the Dayton Agreement which divided Bosnia-Herzegovina into two “entities” (mini-states): the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (“Muslim-Croat Federation”) and the Republic of Srpska (Serbian Republic). They feel that the Republic of Srpska, having been founded on boundaries resulting from alleged ethnic cleansing, is an illegal entity and many Bosniak politicians state outright their wish to see it dissolved. Tensions between the Federation and RS have made Bosnia-Herzegovina the region’s most dysfunctional country, with reforms to bring it closer to the European Union consistently stalled and delayed. Bosniaks wish to see a unified Bosnia-Herzegovina with abolition of the two entities. Many in the West support the Bosniaks’ drive for a unified multi-ethnic state, as they feel it reflects European racial values far better than the current ethnically-divided country. Tensions in Bosnia have been steadily increasing in recent months as the Bosniaks’ calls for the abolition of the RS and the Serbs’ drawing of parallels with Kosovo gather strength. A crisis labelled Bosnia’s worst since the signing of Dayton was recently resolved, although how long this respite will last is anyone’s guess.

Serbs. The Serbs are by far the most-dissatisfied of the former Yugoslav nations. They feel that the events of the past 17 years have been consistently to their detriment, and harbour intense feelings of frustration, anger, and humiliation. Serbia was the most powerful nation in the Western Balkans following its independence from the Ottoman Empire. Its territory encompassed most of today’s Serbia (including Kosovo), Montenegro and Macedonia. Serbs are also the most numerous and geographically diverse of the Yugoslav nations, with sizeable populations of Serbs living for centuries in Bosnia and Croatia. It is this geographic distribution that has been the source of much of the problems behind the wars of the 1990s. When Yugoslavia fractured, Serbs were distributed throughout four independent countries. In contrast, all other nationalities were more or less unified within their national borders. When the Serbs attempted to break away from the new states of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Helsinki Final Act was rigidly applied and this was declared illegal. How can this universally accepted international principle apply to new countries more than to 100-year-old ones? It is this question that has fuelled much of the discontent among ethnic Serbs in the former Yugoslavia.

Attempts by Serbs to create a “Greater Serbia” to unite their kin within single borders was condemned and considered contrary to the spirit of multiculturalism of the European Union. True as this may be, this is exactly what the Slovenes, Yugoslav Macedonians and to a lesser extent Croats, were granted. Slovenia, within its 1974 Socialist Republic of Slovenia borders, encompassed almost all Slovenes in the federation. Secession of Slovenia posed no problems to either Slovenes, or the other ethnic groups. Croatia’s secession in 1991 took a sizeable Serb population with it. This Serb region defied the Republic of Croatia’s independence by declaring its own independence from Croatia, in the form of the Republic of Srpska Krajina. The world accepted the change of Yugoslavia’s borders, but not of Croatia’s. The Croat-Serb conflict was resolved with the forced expulsion of around 200,000 Serbs from the RSK by the Croatian Army, celebrated annually as the Victory and Homeland Thanksgiving Day. Serbs believe that the world turned a blind eye to this forced eviction with no mention of genocide or ethnic cleansing

A similar, but far bloodier, situation occurred when Bosnia-Herzegovina declared independence. As discussed above, the conflict was resolved by giving Bosnian Serbs substantial autonomy within a sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the form of the Republic of Srpska. Opinion polls in the Republic of Srpska regularly show over 70 per cent in favour of independence from Bosnia, yet the perception is that the international community would never allow this. Additionally, there is a feeling that the world media demonised Serbia during the 1990s by painting a black and white picture of the regional conflict, casting Serbs as the sole aggressors on the innocent Bosniaks and Croats. Bosniak and Croat atrocities are seen to be minimised, while Serb war crimes, such as the genocide in Srebrenica, are used to cast collective guilt on the Serb nation

Kosovo, which erupted onto the international stage in 1999, is a complex issue, and brings together many of the above grievances and inconsistencies. Kosovo is seen by the Serbs as the heartland of Serbian culture, and is home to thousands of centuries-old Serbian Orthodox churches, monasteries and other cultural sites. The last century has seen a demographic shift, where for various reasons, the Serb population has dwindled while the Albanian population has become dominant. Kosovo currently has a population of just under two million, of which 92 per cent are Albanian. In 1974, Yugoslavia’s leaders gave Kosovo unprecedented autonomy. This, combined with alleged systematic persecution and violence toward the ethnic Serbs, lead to a growing tension between Serbs and the Albanian majority. In 1989, the Serbian leadership revoked Kosovo’s autonomy and began militarily suppressing separatist movements in the province. In 1999, NATO, disregarding the United Nations, began a 78-day bombing campaign on Serbia proper, to force the leadership to withdraw its army from Kosovo. This was the only time during the 1990s that war came to Serbia proper. The international community is now widely supporting Kosovo’s independence from Serbia, and Kosovo’s Albanian leaders have made clear their intention to unilaterally declare independence following the end of negotiations on 10 December 2007.

Kosovo holds a special meaning in Serb history. It is seen as the cradle of the Serb nation, and on its soil lie the oldest Serb monuments. The Serb psyche also holds the defeat of the Serbian army at Kosovo Field in 1389 in a not dissimilar way to the Texan view of the loss at the Battle of the Alamo. For centuries, the region has been central to Serbian national identity. For this reason, even without the repeated losses of the past 17 years, Serbia would likely strongly oppose Kosovo’s independence. When viewed in the context of Yugoslavia’s break up however, this deals yet another blow to the dignity and self-respect of a once proud people. It is also yet another example, in Serb eyes, of the international community’s double standard. If the Helsinki Final Act protects the territorial integrity of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, why should the rules for Serbia be any different? To put it another way, territorial integrity is strictly enforced when the Serbs wish to secede, but is disregarded when others seek the same goal.

Albanians. The Albanians, particularly those living on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, are arguably the second-most frustrated of the Balkan nationalities. Like the Serbs, Yugoslavia’s disintegration has left significant Albanian populations scattered over four or five (depending on your view of Kosovo) separate states. This has lead to numerous extremist groups calling for a “Greater Albania”, in much the same way that a “Greater Serbia” was proposed in the 1990s. The Albanian National Army, a recognised terrorist organisation, is active in regions of southern Serbia, Kosovo and Macedonia. The Albanians’ plight, like that of the Serbs, is a result of centuries of wrangling between various powers for territory. Albanians have lived alongside Slavs for centuries, and consider Kosovo and Macedonia as much their homeland as the Serbs and Macedonians do. The demographic shift over the last 100 years has now made them a significant majority in Kosovo, and this gives them enormous power to push for the province’s independence. Having been subjected to Serb oppression (itself a response to Albanian persecution, a never-ending tit-for-tat characteristic of the Balkans), the Kosovo Albanians will never accept rule from Belgrade. If given independence however (and thus technically disregarding the Helsinki Final Act), there are fears that a similar result may be sought in Albanian-dominant regions of Macedonia, southern Serbia and Montenegro.

Overview

It is clear from the above discussion that the aftermath of the fall of Yugoslavia has left a clear imbalance in outcomes for the various nationalities living in the Balkans. While Slovenes, Croats, Montenegrins and Macedonians have achieved, more or less, national unity and independence, the Serbs and Albanians have been left scattered over numerous borders. Furthermore, the Serbs’ perceive themselves as repeated victims of an unfair and inconsistent international response to the region. When the almost inevitable independence of Kosovo comes, this will cause even further frustration and humiliation. There exists a possibility too that the Albanians, morally strengthened by their win in Kosovo, will seek to further carve out territory for themselves to continue their own desire for national unity. This situation is not conducive to even short-term peace and stability on the Balkan peninsula. As long as such an imbalance in outcomes exists, with very clear winners and similarly clear losers, peace will be a long way off. The message from the West that the Serbs are to blame for instability in the Balkans may not be entirely incorrect, but this situation is as much a consequence of the international community’s bungled approach to the region as it is to the Serb’s ambitions of national unity. An ambition, it should be mentioned, that with the exception of the Albanians, all other peoples of the Balkans have achieved.

Part two of this series will seek to investigate where the world went wrong with its approach to Yugoslavia, and what options still exist to provide long-term stability in the region.